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In response to the COVID pandemic, the Norwegian government implemented the 
strictest border controls in modern Norwegian history, barring entry to most foreign 
nationals. The Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, justified these policies with reference to 
the rise of new COVID variants and the need to limit visitors to Norway as much as 
possible. As this approach has severe adverse effects on many people, there is a need 
to critically examine the justification given for closing the border. In this paper, we 
argue that while many border restrictions are legitimate, (1) the arguments given for 
the recent banning of entry for groups of people are not convincing, and (2) that the 
ban unduly limits personal freedoms and places an unjust burden on transnational 
citizens and Norwegians with close relations abroad. 
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On 29 January 2021, the Norwegian government introduced the strictest entry rules 
since March 2020 – which were the strictest since World War II. People who did 
not have Norwegian citizenship or reside in Norway would no longer have access 
to the country, with a few exceptions. Most foreign citizens were denied entry. 
These included the following groups: parents of children over 18, grandparents, 
adult children, partners, siblings, seasonal workers, guest researchers and students. 
This placed a heavy burden on transnational citizens,1 international migrants who 
have attachments and connections in other countries, and Norwegian residents 
who have attachments abroad. Many were unable to see their families or start new 
jobs, and as the border closure was open-ended, with no end in sight, they often 
found themselves in an existential limbo, unable to plan for the future.  
The Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg justified the restrictions with 
reference to the increased spread of COVID-19 (hereafter: COVID)2 variants, and 
the need to limit the numbers of visitors (Office of the Prime Minister 27.01.2021). 
On 18 June 2021, the Norwegian Government announced a partial relaxation of 
some these measures, to begin from July 5th (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). At 
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the same time, the government announced it was moving to Step 3 in its reopening 
plan, enabling people to have more guests at home, and more people being able to 
attend public events (Office of the Prime Minister(b) 2021). However, for many the 
borders would stay closed, as Prime Minister Solberg put it:  
We must continue to take care. The infection situation is still unpredictable in 
many places around the world, and there is uncertainty associated with the 
mutations. This is why we need to maintain a high level of preparedness and 
restrict entry into Norway. The reopening of Norway is contingent upon us 
being able to hold back on opening our borders (Office of the Prime 
Minister(b), 2021). 
In other words, Solberg argued that in order to have quite limited measures in place 
in Norway, the borders must stay closed. This decision to close the border to most 
foreigners, and its justification, are the topic of this article. Does the justification by 
the Norwegian Government stand up to moral scrutiny? And what can we learn 
from a moral reconstruction of the justification of border closure?  
The answers to these questions are not trivial and a lot is at stake. While many 
questions have been asked about the legitimacy of lockdowns,3 fewer questions have 
been posed about border closures as a pandemic response.4 And though the security 
of citizens and the protection of basic human rights are often invoked as reasons 
for states’ right to control borders (Blake 2013, Wellmann 2020), these concerns 
have to be balanced against the prospective immigrants’ interest in being admitted.5 
Many transnational individuals, whose lives occur in more than one country, have 
seen their lives more severely impacted than others’ over this last year. They not 
only have to comply with domestic restrictions, but in many cases have not been 
able to see their loved ones for well over a year. It is therefore of particular 
importance for the state to offer these individuals solid justification.  
Thus, it seems reasonable to ask, generally and more concretely in Norway’s 
case, what justifies border closures in the present pandemic. This is not likely to be 
the last pandemic we experience in our lifetime, and more countries might seek to 
employ border closures as new variants spread. With this in mind, it is pressing that 
we investigate the justification of many of the new policies that have been employed 
in the last two years and whether they can stand up to moral scrutiny.  
One caveat before we move on to our argument. It is important to note that we 
are not questioning the justifiability of border control policies as such as a response 
to the COVID pandemic. Indeed, requiring quarantine, vaccine certificates and 
testing on arrival can be seen as directly aimed at controlling the spread of the 
COVID pandemic, and while there might be issues of proportionality and who 
should cover their costs, we do not consider these in this paper. We think having 
requirements for testing and quarantine is reasonable if there is a danger of 
spreading new variants across borders, or if the level of infections is significantly 
higher in some countries than others. However, we will consider in more detail the 
most drastic border control policy, that of partially or fully closing the border.6 To 
avoid confusion when considering other border control policies, we will refer to 
them as “border restrictions” in what follows, unless the context explains otherwise.  
This is how we will proceed: In the next section, we will discuss possible 
justifications for border closure, some explicitly endorsed by the Norwegian 
government and some not. Our aim in this section is to morally reconstruct, discuss 
and refute these arguments. In particular, we consider three approaches that each 
 




comprise a bundle of arguments: the ‘imported infection’ argument, the pragmatic 
argument, and the sovereignty argument. In brief, they argue that border closures 
are needed in order to limit imported infections, that they are pragmatically 
justifiable both politically and due to limited knowledge, and that the state has the 
sovereign right to control who enters its territory. Subsequently, in the third section 
of the paper, we will put forward arguments against border closure. Here, two 
strands of argumentation stand out: the argument rooted in freedom, and the 
justice argument. In short, we argue that the recent measures unjustly limited the 
freedoms of many individuals, both Norwegians and foreigners, and that they 
placed not only an unequal, but also an unjust burden on some people.  
One final admission: We are aware that each of the arguments we discuss could 
be expanded into a paper in its own right. However, our choice in this paper has 
been to consider the major arguments one can reconstruct from the public debate 
and give all of them some consideration. That is, in the paper we are primarily 
interested in considering and criticizing the various arguments that might support 
border closures, and we are well aware that much more can be said about many of 
the issues we discuss. We are willing to sacrifice some depth for the sake achieving 
more breadth in the argumentation. This does not mean, we hope, that our 
arguments have no depth, but it does mean that we focus on addressing each of the 
relevant arguments for border closure and leave a more detailed, thorough 
discussion of some of the arguments to other papers. 
  
Attempts to justify border closures in the ongoing pandemic  
As noted, we will present three arguments in this section. We will argue that none 
of these arguments justify Norway’s recent border regime before moving on to 
consider the positive case against the measure in the following section.  
 
The ‘imported infection’ argument 
The most commonly cited reason for closing the border for groups of people is to 
limit the risk of importing infections. Indeed, as mentioned above, one of the most 
common grounds for justifying immigration control is a government’s need to 
protect the rights and security of its own citizens (Blake 2013, Wellmann 2020). We 
will get back to how one might weigh such a right to limit immigration against the 
rights to free movement towards the end of the article, but first we must assess 
whether there are good grounds in the case of the pandemic for this commonly 
cited justification.   
In governmental press release and other news articles,7 some central claims are 
repeated: the spread of COVID in Norway is largely due to imported infections, 
and therefore the borders must be closed so that these infections can no longer enter 
the country (Office of the Prime Minister(a) 2021) (Fange 2021). 
In these articles the politicians do not merely want to explain, but also to justify 
the closing of Norwegian borders to large groups of people. However, what is the 
justification we are given? As far as we can tell, the reason given for closing borders 
is that people coming from abroad have brought in the virus. The most common 
concerns raised against this closure have been the economic consequences and the 
rather indiscriminate manner of border closure. In particular, the plight of migrant 
workers and cross-country commuters from Sweden is highlighted. Yet, the basic 
question is not asked: Why is this fact – that someone coming from abroad might 
 




bring in the virus or new variants of the virus – enough to justify not merely 
increased border restrictions, such as more testing, vaccine requirements and 
quarantine, but also the closing of borders?  
Consider the following three points. One, the fact that is appealed to – 
‘importing’ infection from abroad – can be cited by every government around the 
world. After all, outside Wuhan, China, where the virus originated, the rest of the 
world imported the virus. If everyone followed Norway’s logic, no one from 
Norway would be able to travel anywhere in the world and no one would be able to 
travel to Norway. Two, the WHO’s recommendation on international traffic is that 
“Travel measures that significantly interfere with international traffic may only be 
justified at the beginning of an outbreak” (World Health Organization 2020 [our 
italics]; cf. Saxena and others 2021: 4-5). The fact that many countries disregard this 
recommendation does not make it bad advice. Indeed, its logic is clear: once a virus 
as infectious as COVID (especially its recent mutant variants) is spreading within a 
country, the surge in cases will be due to domestic spread and not due to 
international travel. While it is difficult to disentangle all the effects of various 
pandemic response policies, both modelling and the limited number of 
observational studies indicate that this is correct: “Models have found that strict 
border closures could have helped limit viral transmission in the pandemic’s early 
days. But once the virus started spreading in other countries, border closures 
provided little benefit” (Mallapaty 2021). At the same time, undue focus on travel 
and border restrictions and closures risks hindering effective infection control 
(Devi 2020). Three, certainly in 2021 the overwhelming majority of infections in 
Norway, and the spread of new variants, have been due to the domestic spread of 
the virus.8  
It therefore does not seem clear why the mere fact that infection reaches a 
country from abroad is sufficient, in itself, to justify closing the border to large 
groups of people. In any case, no perfect closure is possible in our world; even 
countries as isolated geographically as New Zealand and Australia have not 
managed to keep the virus out entirely (as evidenced by repeated local lockdowns). 
So, it is natural to ask why closing the borders is chosen instead of controlling and 
restricting – via quarantine, testing, isolation – the flow of people through them?  
Perhaps the WHO recommendation should be handled with more caution, 
though. One could argue that Norway, when it closed its borders, was in the 
beginning phase of the pandemic compared to other countries since the infection 
level had been low, and during the Spring of 2021 the percentage of new variants 
was low. Yet, based on the publicly available figures it seems clear that Norway 
experienced both a significant domestic spread of the virus, as well as a significant 
domestic spread of new variants. In fact, a New Zealand or Australia-type of 
complete border closure, whereby their own citizens were also denied entry, has 
never been proposed in Norway. Moreover, most of the virus infections that have 
been brought into Norway over the last year have come via guest workers and 
holidaying Norwegians. In order to reduce the spread due to these groups arriving, 
the government implemented testing and quarantine requirements. And if these 
measures did not work well enough, that is perhaps due to them not being enforced 
strongly; not because they are unsuitable for infection control.9 This is clear from 
the practice of many countries in Europe where borders remained open and only a 
tiny percentage of infections came from abroad.10  
 




To sum up: We do not think that border restrictions are an ineffective tool in 
controlling pandemics. This is certainly not the case and research supports this well 
(Haug, Geyrhofer & Londei 2020; Voigt and others forthcoming). But the question 
is why border restrictions must take the form of partial or complete border closures. 
Indeed, border restrictions such as quarantine and testing can be intrusive, but 
border closures are even more severe measures, both economically as well as 
socially. Thus, a very strong justification should be given for their introduction – 
and we have found no such public epidemiological justification. In particular, little 
justification and debate, grounded on epidemiological projections, have been 
provided as to why border closures rather than increased testing and quarantine 
were needed, nor an evaluation of what the impact of the various policy choices 
might be. In special circumstances, perhaps as in the case of New Zealand and 
Australia, a suppression strategy that employs complete border closure can be 
warranted. Perhaps it is, ceteris paribus – though we will argue below that it does 
not. But Norway has not been, and in 2021 certainly is not, in an even remotely 
similar situation. Given all the other available forms of border control policies – 
testing, home quarantine, hotel quarantine, home or hotel isolation – unilateral 
border closures for foreigners seem to be an unwarranted way of controlling the 
spread of the virus. At least the Government has not provided an epidemiological 
justification for why such closures were needed.11 
 
The pragmatic argument 
One possible reason behind present Norwegian border policy could be political. For 
some time the parliamentary support for the previous right-wing government was 
secured by the FrP (The Progress Party), the most nationalistic and anti-
immigration mainstream political party in Norway. There might therefore be a 
temptation to be seen as strict on immigration, particularly since 2021 was an 
election year.12 However, we are reluctant to take such political considerations as 
good arguments for border closure. It is hardly relevant for the rightness and 
wrongness of such a policy, whether or not it promotes the popularity of the 
government. This might well explain the policy, but it most certainly does not 
morally justify it.  
There is, however, another candidate for a pragmatic justification of border 
closures. In a recent article, Scheall & Crutchfield (2021) argue that their previous 
work on how policy makers’ ignorance – having to do with their epistemic burdens 
– influences their choice of policy, can also be applied to COVID measures. “The 
fundamental problem of politics,” they write, “is that even if policymakers’ 
motivations align with their constituents’ interests, policymakers may not possess the 
knowledge necessary to deliberately realize relevant policy objectives.” (Scheall & 
Crutchfield 2021: 20) This, they argue, applies to policy choice in the circumstances 
of the pandemic. In particular, they argue that “rather than adopting a focused-
protection policy that would have required the identification and isolation of 
uniquely vulnerable patient populations, policymakers have opted to try to 
minimize physical suffering due to the virus via the blunt and comparatively 
simplistic tool of economic and societal lockdown.” (Scheall & Crutchfield 2021: 
19) One could – it certainly appears tempting – see border closures in the same 
light: they are also “blunt and comparatively simplistic” ways of dealing with 
imported infections.  
 




However, what is important to note is once again the difference between 
explanation and justification. Scheall and Crutchfield acknowledge that their 
proposal is only meant to accomplish the former task: “Our interest is to explain 
why certain kinds of policies were chosen and why other kinds of policies were 
mostly ignored, not to defend any of these policies as either uniquely appropriate 
to relevant circumstances or morally defensible.” (Scheall & Crutchfield 2021: fn. 
6) This, as they argue, is a particularly salient point in later phases of the pandemic, 
in particular after the Autumn of 2020, as we by then had amassed significant pool 
of knowledge about both the pandemic and about relevant counter-pandemic 
policies. In short, policymakers should have learnt which policies are more efficient 
and which are not in terms of their overall effects, that is, not merely their direct 
health effects, but also their indirect, social effects. There is, in other words, a 
difference between ignorance and ignorance. Some ignorance is justified, and 
perhaps this was true of ignorance at the start of the pandemic (although lack of 
preparation can still be criticized13). Policymakers could perhaps not help but be 
epistemically impoverished in the initial phase of the COVID pandemic, and 
therefore to err on the safe side, be blunt and comparatively simplistic in their 
policy choices. One might therefore reasonably argue that such a precautionary 
approach was justifiable, given the lack of knowledge early on in the pandemic. 
However, the ignorance of the later stages does not appear to be of an excusable 
kind that could warrant blunt measures like border closures. It would therefore 
seem to be less legitimate currently to move from explanation to justification of 
policy choices based on epistemic ignorance. 
Finally, one could argue that, due to the emergence of new variants, we are 
continuously in an epistemically impoverished situation. But this does not sound 
reasonable. Although variants indeed emerge, only very few of them are classified 
as variants of concern or of interest by the WHO.14 These variants, most recently 
the dominant delta variant and the now threatening omicron variant, emerge rarely 
and not entirely unexpectedly (insofar as we know that unless a significant majority 
of world population is vaccinated, the emergence of variants is likely). This has two 
important consequences. One, the claim that we are continuously in an 
epistemically impoverished situation is false. We think the following appears to be 
a more accurate description: we are moving between long periods of relative 
epistemic certainty (‘calm’) through short periods of epistemic uncertainty 
(‘upheaval’). Two, in between these long periods we have ample time to prepare for 
the emergence of new variants. This is especially so since by now the relevant 
institutions have developed effective ways of monitoring and studying COVID 
variants, we have vaccinations and we now also have COVID medications. All in 
all, what follows from the virus’ tendency to mutate is that there might at most be 
short periods when border closures are warranted – although we would even doubt 
that that is the case.15 
However, Scheall & Crutchfield (2021), do provide some further explanations 
as to why politicians seemingly have not learned much from their past mistakes and 
used their amassed experience. One idea concerns the ‘pretence of knowledge’: 
policymakers were perhaps ignorant of their own relevant ignorance, which has 
incentivized them to continue pursuing policies that were not nearly as effective as 
they have claimed them to be, a fact they would have realized had they 
acknowledged their earlier ignorance of the matter. A second, according to the 
 




authors more relevant proposal is the following: “Past policy decisions affect 
present and future epistemic burdens. In particular, unless policymakers know how 
to both alter the chosen policy course and avoid the consequences of acknowledging 
its ineffectiveness, the alternative of doubling-down on the existing policy is 
comparatively attractive” (Scheall & Crutchfield 2021: 24). This is basically status 
quo bias: it is cheaper and easier to continue with present policy, despite evidence 
to its ineffectiveness, than to change course with all its costs and uncertainties. The 
political price might be way too much to pay.  
These are no doubt interesting hypotheses that are worth further elaboration 
and probing. What is difficult to see is how this might morally justify policy choice. 
The ignorance we are here dealing with is perhaps rather a form of wilful ignorance: 
policymakers, driven by their own interests, in both scenarios chose not to do 
something despite available evidence. And this latter kind of ignorance is hardly 
justifiable from a moral point of view.  
 
The sovereignty argument 
Within the philosophy of migration there are some debates that are relevant for the 
topic under consideration, in particular when it comes to various theories of what 
justifies a state’s control over its borders. The arguments that rely on collective self-
determination are particularly pertinent in our case (Altman & Wellman 2011, Fine 
2013, Miller 2016, Song 2018). These arguments build on the idea that states need 
to control their borders in order to allow for collective self-determination. If such 
arguments are to justify the current partial border closures, they must rely on two 
assumptions: First, territorial states have the right to decide what happens on their 
territory, including border policy. Second, if they are also democracies, government 
policy should follow the majority view, which could support border closures during 
the present pandemic. Since both arguments rely on some idea of popular 
sovereignty – understood, roughly, as the claim that the people are the ultimate 
source of political authority - we call this the sovereignty argument.  
The first thing to note about this argument is that none of its proponents argue 
that such a right to collective self-determination is unlimited. As Sarah Fine puts it 
in discussing the particularly vexed case of immigration: “We cannot simply come 
down on the side of the state without explaining exactly why the state’s claims 
trump those of would-be immigrants, or without thinking carefully about the limits 
to the state’s legitimate claims regarding self-determination” (2013: 263). This looks 
fairly uncontroversial: surely, states cannot just decide to do anything in the name 
of collective self-determination and claim that such a justification trumps all others. 
While states can decide their policies within reason, there are other concerns, rights 
and interests than self-determination that need to be weighed. For example, while 
states can decide to attack other states or punish their own population, these are all 
severe actions that, because they clearly conflict with the rights, interests, dignity of 
some people, call for a justification. The same is true in the present case: border 
closures in a pandemic are among the most severe actions a state can take, and 
whether or not this can be done in the name of state sovereignty is a matter for 
(public) justification.  
Let us therefore consider what might be the minimal requirements for such a 
justification. In her review of theories of migration, Sarah Song points out that even 
if collective self-determination does not require a democratic regime, it does require  
 




at least the following kinds of institutional mechanisms. First, there must be 
protections for basic rights and liberties, including the right to bodily integrity, 
subsistence, and freedom of speech and association. Second, there must be 
institutional mechanisms of accountability, including the right to dissent from 
and appeal collective decisions. Third, government must provide public 
rationales for its decisions in terms of a conception of the common good of the 
society (2018: 395). 
Song argues that on the basis of such mechanisms a state’s control over immigration 
may be justified. However, it seems apparent that several of these mechanisms are 
not in place in relation to Norway’s recent border closure. First, a series of freedoms 
are violated by closed borders: freedom of movement, freedom to choose and 
pursue an occupation – even setting immigrants aside, Norway’s border regime 
seriously disadvantages guest workers, commuters and members of transnational 
families.16 Furthermore, the closures impacted the freedom to marry and start a 
family, not only for cross-border and transnational families, but also for all those 
whose intimate relationships were not covered by one of the exemptions. Of course, 
no freedoms are meant to be unlimited, and one can meaningfully discuss where 
the limits lie in different circumstances, and which freedoms should be given 
priority. We address this in some detail below. Succinctly put, we do not believe 
that, especially given existing alternatives, i.e., border restrictions such as 
quarantining and testing as opposed to border closure, the imposed constraints on 
these freedoms are justified.  
As for the second mechanism Song mentions, it is worth differentiating between 
those who have voting rights and those who do not. Norwegian citizens have direct 
ways of influencing government policy via periodical national elections. So, at least 
for them, some level of accountability is established.17 Those who cannot vote are a 
diverse group ranging from guest workers to permanent residents. Regarding 
accountability it is also important to mention that the government – and many, if 
not most, governments in Europe (and the world) – have acquired special powers.18 
This significantly reduces accountability. Lastly, the two groups also differ in terms 
of the forms of dissent available to them. If they break the rules, Norwegian citizens 
face mainly fines, whereas those who belong to the other group face, potentially, 
deportation from the country. This difference of burdens resulting from border 
closure will play a role below in our positive arguments against border closures.  
The presence of the third mechanism, regarding public rationale, in the COVID 
pandemic in Norway is also questionable. Of course, the government is closing 
borders as part of its effort to stop the spread of the virus. This no doubt serves the 
common good. However, this is only the case when considering the measure in 
isolation, rather than comparing it to other possible measures – in this case border 
restrictions that might consist of testing, quarantine, isolation and targeted, short-
term closures (towards particular countries and regions with significant outbreaks). 
And as we have argued above, it is far from obvious that border closure is the 
superior solution and that it therefore, on the whole, serves the common good. At a 
minimum, the government would need to provide a public rationale that includes 
evidence for why border closures, as opposed to border restrictions, are preferable 
and necessary.  
Collective self-determination can but need not take a democratic form, though 
it does so in Norway. So, assuming the majority of the Norwegian public supports 
 




border closure, is that not just enough to justify the policy? We do not think that it 
is. In addition to the above minimal requirements, in the case of democracies, more 
stringent conditions should be appealed to. Liberal democracies combine the idea 
of popular sovereignty – taken here to entail some kind of simplified majority rule 
– with restrictions on the power of the state (such as checks and balances, separation 
of powers, bill of rights, judicial review and so on). Clearly, border closure, as it has 
been applied in Norway, infringes on the rights, entitlements and privileges, such 
as freedom of movement, of many Norwegian citizens and foreign residents. The 
people affected may be the minority, but in a liberal democracy like Norway they 
deserve protection. In any case, some special justification would be needed, which 
has not been provided and which we have not found so far. 
One could still say that all of the above discussion presupposes one crucial thing: 
that the political collective in question – the Norwegian political community – does 
in fact include those whose rights are not respected, for whom proper dissent is not 
available and to whom the decision-makers are not properly accountable. But is this 
really so? One could deny this and argue that the Norwegian government does not 
therefore owe anything to those people whose rights are here being impinged. Yet, 
the truth of this position is far from clear. At this point it is worth reminding 
ourselves of exactly who have been impacted by border closures. No doubt many 
migrants with no ties to the country have been affected. But let us set them aside 
for now – in this paper our aim is not to argue for a more liberal immigration policy 
per se. Even so, many more people affected by the policy remain, for whom the 
present approach is at least questionable. Take Norwegian citizens first. Presumably 
not even an imaginary objector would doubt that they are part of the relevant 
collective. The largest group are probably those who are residents but not citizens: 
EU/EEA citizens, permanent residents, and relevant visa holders. What about 
them?  
Exactly how we understand the ‘people’ in question becomes important here. 
This is another much discussed issue. If one subscribes to a nationalist or some kind 
of culture-based approach, many individuals who are ‘only’ residents in the country 
may not belong to the collective. But this is not the only way to conceive of 
‘peoplehood.’ As Sarah Fine (2013: 264) points out, “[m]any states are 
multinational, many national groups cross over the borders of states, and many 
citizens of many states do not identify with the majority national group in that 
state.” It is therefore not always easy to define exactly who constitutes the people 
who are supposed to be self-determining. For example, Song (2018: 396) prefers an 
account on which “a people comes into being by participating together in ways that 
express an aspiration to be authors, not merely subjects, of the rules governing 
collective life.” And the people so construed, on her account, become connected to 
a particular territory by virtue of its members having a pre-institutional right to 
occupancy on the given territory. This in turn is grounded in peoples’ stable 
residency for the pursuit of life projects, claims Song. We cannot pursue this topic 
further here, but our point is simple: plausible ways exist to constitute the people, 
connect them to a territory and be part of the collective that do not exclude 
individuals with stable residence and whose centre of life is in the given place. And 
these people, however variously constituted, have not been given adequate 
justification for the border closure. 
 
 




Why not close borders in the pandemic: some positive considerations  
Based on the above discussion, we would argue that the recent Norwegian border 
closures are unjustified. Are there other positive arguments as to why Norway 
should try to avoid such policies in the future? In the following we discuss two such 
arguments: the freedom argument, which considers how we should balance various 
limits on freedoms, and the justice argument, wherein we consider the distribution 
of burdens.  
 
The freedom argument 
It is clear that closing borders violates several freedoms; hence a natural argument 
against border closures can be made in the name of protecting our freedoms. 
However, this argument is too simplistic, since it is also a well-known dictum that 
no freedoms are unlimited. In particular, freedoms can clash with each other and 
in the process of adjudication some must therefore be restricted. We accept that 
also in Norway certain freedoms can be restricted, and this applies especially in the 
special circumstances of a global pandemic. We will consider an approach to this 
question using a broadly Rawlsian framework.19  
The starting point is that not all freedoms are created equal. In the liberal 
tradition, certain freedoms are considered ‘basic.’ These freedoms, moreover, can 
only be restricted in order to promote a balance between all fundamental freedoms. 
The ultimate aim, as embodied in John Rawls’ (2001: 42-3) first principle of justice, 
is to provide everyone with “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties.” We 
have already mentioned that border closure negatively affects many freedoms that 
are normally considered basic liberties: freedom of movement, freedom to choose 
and pursue an occupation, freedom to marry and start a family. So, following a 
Rawlsian approach, it must now be shown that fewer of these liberties will help us 
enjoy other basic freedoms more. Is this really the case? This seems to be the case 
only if one takes the right to health to be a basic right and assumes that its 
promotion furthers the overall balance of freedoms for individuals.  
We can accept that the right to health is a basic right. Rawls himself does not 
mention it, but as we already noted, basic rights and liberties come under general 
headings that comprise a family of more specific rights and liberties. Nickel (1994: 
769) argues, for example, that “the avoidance of the destruction of one’s health and 
normal physical and mental abilities” should be acknowledged as a ‘security right.’ 
What remains now is the issue of promotion, and here things get more complicated. 
Originally, Rawls (1971: 302) had a maximizing view of the basic liberties: his liberty 
principle required everyone “to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties.” Using this maximizing conception, it is very hard 
to see how one could argue that promotion of the right to health would be justified, 
given how many other basic rights and liberties are negatively affected.  
However, in response to criticism, Rawls gave up this conception and switched 
to the idea of a ‘fully adequate scheme,’ as quoted above. Exactly how this clause is 
to be understood is an intricate matter, but the notion that plays a central role is 
that of “the central range of applications” of basic liberties. Rawls’ view is that if a 
liberty is basic then, within its “central range of application,” only restrictions upon 
it that promote the overall balance of basic liberties within a scheme of liberty can 
be justified. How we obtain a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties is by using our 
institutions to secure the basic liberties in their central range of application, and if 
 




this is not possible, by showing that restrictions within this central range promote 
the overall balance of basic liberties. (Rawls 1971: 244; 2001: 111; 2005: 295). The 
question that then needs to be asked is whether the liberties violated by border 
closure belong to the central range of application of more general basic liberties. 
 We believe they do. The general framework is given by another Rawlsian idea. 
Rawls (2005: 290) writes that two phases are involved in providing a defensible 
system of basic liberties. The first phase involves specifying a list of basic liberties 
under general headings. The second involves further specifying this list by 
determining the significance of different particular liberties that come under the 
same general heading and adjudicating over conflicts between them. For example, 
while in the first phase freedom of movement is recognized as a basic liberty coming 
under the even more general category of liberties of the person, in the second phase 
it is recognized that certain types of liberties of movement (e.g., going on vacation) 
are much less important than others (e.g., attending a political rally). Border 
closures, it seems to us, clearly impinge upon forms of freedom of movement that 
are very important and that belong to the central range of application of freedom 
of movement. We think, moreover, that the same is true of the other affected basic 
liberties. Even setting immigration aside, Norway’s border regime seriously 
disadvantages guest workers, commuters, and members of transnational families, 
but also all those intimate relationships that are impacted and not covered by one 
of the exemptions to the general closure system. This means that to maintain a fully 
adequate system of basic liberties, it would have to be shown how these restrictions 
sufficiently promote other basic liberties. As argued above, we do not think that 
merely promoting security rights, such as the right to health, adequately shows this.  
There are three additional reasons for this. First, we should not forget that, as 
we have emphasized throughout this paper, border closures are not the only way of 
dealing with imported infections. Border restrictions of different types and 
strictness can be used instead. These restrictions would arguably compromise our 
basic liberties (much) less than border closures do. So, even if we are wrong about 
promoting the balance of basic liberties above, border restrictions are likely to 
promote the same balance better.  
Second, it is important to consider that there is a major discrepancy between 
Norway’s domestic and international border policy. Despite the domestic spread of 
the virus, similar restrictions have never been imposed on domestic travel. Indeed, 
there have been recommendations to avoid unnecessary domestic travel, but no 
restrictions have been placed on domestic travel. Furthermore, we find an 
interesting difference regarding what has been considered necessary domestically 
versus internationally. Whereas the government has been more willing to consider 
journeys within Norway for the purposes of family visits as “essential”20, such 
journeys across international borders have more often been deemed 
“nonessential”21. This is relevant since we could argue that the balance of basic 
liberties is promoted because all the domestic liberties have remained in place. 
However, it is at least questionable to what extent – if at all – domestic restrictions 
have to be balanced against international measures in this way. Some of our 
arguments concerning the importance of imported infections are relevant here: 
how significant is the connection between border closures and relative domestic 
freedom and security?  
 




Finally, third, one could also question the legitimacy of distinguishing freedoms 
in this way: what places domestic freedom of movement, family life, work 
relationships and so on above their international counterparts from a moral point 
of view?22 Sharply distinguishing freedoms in this way is far from self-evident, even 
if often politically expedient (because it is implicitly or explicitly accepted by the 
public). 
 
The justice argument 
Our final argument against current border closures builds on theories of 
distributive justice and relates to how burdens are distributed and relationships 
respected. First, there is reason to doubt whether the distribution of burdens 
resulting from border closure in Norwegian society is just. There is no question that 
the distribution of burdens is unequal. What we have said so far illustrates this. We 
are speaking here of transnational families, other groups with immigrant 
backgrounds, migrant workers, foreign students, and so on. These people are not 
able to do what other members of their society can: travel, meet their loved ones, 
spend time with their children, or do their jobs. These activities are important, 
moreover, as they are identity-constituting and foster basic relationships, features 
and abilities.  
Furthermore, the borders have only been closed for a particular group, whereas 
many Norwegians have been able to continue to travel, subject to border 
restrictions. Arguably it is the former group who bear the heavier burden of 
restrictions on their movement, as they are most likely to suffer a severe impact on 
their close relationships due to such restrictions. If we were really attempting to 
distribute burdens more equally, it would be more reasonable to put in place a 
policy that limited the travel of Norwegian citizens, rather than foreigners, as the 
former group is likely to suffer less. We are not advocating such a policy, but this 
example illustrates the inequality in burden sharing.   
Now, an easy-sounding retort could be made that these demands are 
unquestionably additional and unequal – but are they also unjust demands? For a 
start, when one part of the population has to satisfy demands that another part of 
society does not, we have at least a prima facie case for injustice. To avoid such a 
conclusion, special justification has to be given. And although Norway’s 
government and even the majority of Norwegians might think that these people 
have to make a sacrifice for the country, such appeal to ‘sacrifice’ can be read in two 
ways. First, it can be understood as an act of charity, or something that goes beyond 
the call of duty (what philosophers call ‘supererogatory’). In this case, these people 
are owed gratitude in one form or another. This is clearly not how the Norwegian 
border policy is understood presently, though. This suggests instead that the 
common perception is that the sacrifice called for is a duty that is morally justified. 
But what would that justification be? We have already been through the attempts 
we could conceive of and have found them wanting. 
Moreover, and to our second point, we are not merely dealing with possible 
injustice regarding the distribution of burdens in Norwegian society. We are also 
discussing a case in which certain relationships become negatively affected; in 
particular, they become unjust in themselves. One reason for this could be the same 
as above: the unequal distribution of burdens. Just think of marriages in which only 
women are required to do certain things (household chores, child rearing) and men 
 




are not. Similarly, if the distribution of burdens becomes unequal in the way 
described above as a result of border closure, the relationship between citizens and 
residents with and without significant cross-border relations becomes unequal and, 
potentially, unjust as well.  
Add to this that not only their share of burdens matters here. Relationships are 
often unjust due to inequalities of power and status. Unequal burdens can be 
responsible for this, but also other aspects of a relationship can be relevant. For 
example, our discussion of the sovereignty argument is relevant here: the power of 
these groups to hold the government accountable differs, sometimes radically; nor 
are their rights to dissent the same. So, in addition to unjust burdens, unjust 
relationships are also created in the wake of border closures. 
 
Summary and concluding remarks 
The choice to close the borders or keep them open is a question of values; it is a 
moral choice. In order for the choice to be justified, it must not merely be explained 
pragmatically or politically but also have a valid moral explanation. What are the 
values that merit this policy choice? Even if border closures, as opposed to rigorous 
border restrictions like quarantining and testing, limit the spread of the virus, what 
justifies the choice that avoiding any increase in infections trumps all other values, 
such as freedom of movement? Furthermore, why should foreign travel be radically 
restricted in order to travel freely domestically and have less strict pandemic 
measures? What justifies this choice? So far, we have found no satisfactory moral 
justification for the closing of borders in the way it has been done in Norway during 
the COVID pandemic. In fact, we cannot see that any attempt has been made to 
justify this policy choice of border closures for certain groups over implementing 
other border restrictions like quarantining, testing and vaccination requirements, 
beyond the vague assumption that it limits infections. Of course, the ultimate 
verdict about border closures in Norway, or elsewhere, has to take an overall, all-
things-considered form: everything we have said provides only a pro tanto reason 
to open borders. However, pending further argumentation to the contrary, we 
believe our paper shows that the balance of these reasons would favour border 
restrictions over closed borders.  
The balance is further tilted in this direction if we consider the possible 
consequences of border closures. Perhaps two of these adverse effects stand out 
most clearly.23 There is already significant evidence that COVID, in part through 
specific pandemic policies, negatively affects refugees, asylum seekers, migrant 
workers, transnational families and so on. Stigmatization, xenophobia and racism 
are perhaps the most dangerous impacts. These kinds of views can be seen in the 
public narratives surrounding the pandemic in Norway: particularly in the 
discussion of importsmitte (imported infection), migrant virus and so on.24 These 
terms stigmatize, and, in some contexts, they are meant to stigmatize and alienate.25 
In addition to the stigmatization embodied by these terms and the direct impact 
this can have on some citizens and migrants, the potential for long-term impact 
also needs to be considered. It is usual to look at a citizen’s or resident’s relation to 
the state as a social contract. The state offers services, such as security, in return for 
the citizen’s willing obedience to its laws. But in the present situation, this compact, 
in the case of many residents, is under severe strain: Many people travel because 
they have loved ones abroad and because their work necessarily involves travelling. 
 




Is it fair that these people cannot do any of these things merely so that Norway 
avoids a possible increase in the level of virus infections in the country? The 
compact requires at a minimum that some solid public justification is offered to 
these people, but such an effort is curiously missing from the Norwegian public 
debate, let alone from the government’s communication to Norwegian residents. 
Though many measures have been implemented to support businesses and people 
who have lost work, this does not help those who cannot see their children, their 
partners or their parents due to border restrictions.  
What will the people whose lives have had to be put on hold due to the border 
closure think of the Norwegian state after the pandemic is over and normality 
returns? And how will they be looked at by the rest of the population? The lack of 
concern for residents, who might also be Norwegian citizens, who live in the 
country, pay their taxes, obey Norwegian laws and contribute in other ways to the 
development of the country, might have a severe impact on people’s trust and 
respect for the Norwegian state. Thus, it seems far from obvious that closing 
borders is a good policy to adopt in a pandemic. 
Pandemics often usher in radical changes in society. It is too early to tell whether 
this will happen now – but our relationships to borders and foreigners, both inside 
and outside the country, might well change and not for the better. Norway should 
decide whether it wants to remain an open country, at least as far as this is possible 
in the given circumstances, or aspires to be one when the next pandemic comes 
around. Or does it instead want to be a closed country that declares itself a virus-
free zone, whatever the cost? If the latter is the case, the state at a very minimum 
needs to justify this choice and explain it to those affected. In Norway, such an 
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1 For a definition, see Horst & Olsen (2021). 
2 For a proper characterization of COVID, see Schwartz (2020). 
3 For a recent discussion, see Kraaijeveld (2020). 
4 Owen (2020) is an exception. 
5 It should be noted that there is also a debate within the literature as to whether the 
interests of citizens might legitimate emigration restrictions, in particular, in 
relation to skilled health workers (Brock & Blake, 2015). The idea being discussed 
is the claim that the need for providing health services in countries, for example, 
justify emigration restrictions. Whereas Brock argues that they can, subject to 
 




certain limitations, Blake is more skeptical about using such policies. We thank a 
reviewer for drawing our attention to this connection. 
6 Partial border closure is the policy of banning entry by particular groups of people 
based on their nationality, for example. By contrast, a complete border closure refers 
to shutting the border to everyone. Norway has endorsed the former policy and has 
not been alone in implementing such policies. Indeed, most countries have 
implemented complete or partial border closures at various times during the 
pandemic (Shiraef et al., 2021). 
7 See, for example, Cogorno (2021). 
8 Look for ‘registrert smitte’ on VG’s online database (VG 2021). 
9 Compare the UK practice, for example Adams (2021). 
10 Italy is a good example. See Gedi Visual (2020) under the heading “Distribuzione 
dell'origine dei casi Covid-19 diagnosticati in Italia.” 
11 The development, introduction and widespread use of vaccines (in particular, the 
new mRNA vaccines) and the even more recent development of medication 
(COVID pills such as Paxlovid) further strengthen this conclusion, of course. 
However, it should be noted that especially the former was used also to open up 
borders throughout the world. The emergence of the latest COVID variant, 
Omicron, appears to be changing this picture as we write, however. Later in the 
text, we argue that this appearance is misleading. 
12 In fact, on 13.01.2021, the FrP has demanded the physical closing of borders (NTB 
2021). And just two weeks later (27.01.2021), their wishes were fulfilled (Huse 
2021). 
13 See the rather damning report of the Independent Panel for Pandemic 
Preparedness Response in Johnson Sirleaf and Clark (2021). 
14 For these classifications, see WHO “Tracking SARS-CoV-2 variants.” 
15 Thus, we are not particularly supportive of the drastic border measures that are 
once again spreading in the world in response to the recently discovered Omicron 
variant (these words were written in December 2021). This new variant poses risks 
along three dimensions: how infectious it is (quickness of spread); how dangerous 
it is (severity of symptoms); how likely it is that it bypasses bodily defenses (vaccine-
induced or otherwise). At least at present there is a near consensus regarding the 
first dimension that the variant is very likely to be more infectious than even the 
Delta variant. The other two dimensions are much harder to assess and so the 
diagnosis of epistemic poverty is more appropriate here. However, what this at most 
justifies are short-term, targeted border closures (to countries where there already 
is community transmission) for the period while we gain more knowledge – this is 
presently roughly estimated to take a couple of weeks until we have community 
transmission within Norway. Moreover, since we have already had similar 
experiences at least twice – the Alpha variant and the Delta variant – by now we 
have, or certainly should have, the relevant systems in place to deal with the 
situation without border closures, such as border restrictions in the form of testing, 
quarantining and tracing). This is also in line with WHO recommendations. For 
more see Harrison (2021). 
16 For ongoing research on the effects of COVID on transnational families in 
Norway, see Bell, Staver & Tolgensbakk (forthcoming). 
17 Although the date has now passed, this was particularly relevant when writing the 
first draft of this article, since Norway had national elections in September 2021. 
 




18 For details, see Ekroll & Ask (2020). 
19 The broader theoretical background for the argument that follows can be found 
in McLeod & Tanyi (forthcoming). 
20 Consider for example the Minister of Justice defending her trip “home” as 
necessary (Janssen 2020). 
21 Specified “essential” trips abroad for Norwegian residents as of May 2021 include 
only such trips as those for the birth of one’s child or seeing seriously ill or dying 
relatives (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2021). 
22 There is a parallel here with a well-known argument from the global justice 
literature: Joseph Carens’ (2013, 238) cantilever argument that argues for a close 
analogy or even logical connection between the right to domestic freedom of 
movement and international freedom of movement. 
23 We think, and in an earlier draft of this paper have elaborated upon how fleshing 
out these considerations could be turned into a consequentialist argument against 
border closures. The argument would run along roughly two lines: how border 
closures lead to damaging exclusionary nationalism and how they destroy social 
cohesion. We also argue in that earlier draft that interesting parallels exist with the 
works of Blake (2002), Egan (2020) and Cabrera (2020), as well as with the empirical 
data in Elias and others (2021). We thank our reviewers for convincing us that such 
a consequentialist argument needs to be expanded before it can be published in its 
own right.  
24 See for example Helland (2021) or Sæbbe (2021). 
25 Consider for example the speech Sylvi Listhaug gave when she became the new 
leader of FrP (Heiervang & Krekling 2021) and contrast her claims with the 
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